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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
schizophrenic by at least four different psychiatrists over a ten year
period; shortly after his arrest, he was declared incompetent to stand
trial.2 3 A mere 43 days later he was considered able to properly defend
himself. As was pointed out in the dissent, it was highly improbable, if
not impossible, for him to have been cured by the short period of treat-
inent before trial. 24 If the jury had been clearly instructed to consider
the seriousness and long history of the defendant's illness, hopefully he
would now be undergoing psychiatric treatment designed to rehabilitate
him rather than serving a life sentence in the state prison.
It is submitted that the courts, as yet, have not met the challenge
of treating a complex problem in a simple and understandable fashion.
At the base of the problem are the difficult communication barriers that
exist between psychiatrists, attorneys, and lay jurors. Furthermore, many
proponents and critics of the tests have allowed their logic to be
clouded because of their less than unanimous accord on how to treat
persons once they have been adjudged insane. Until these difficulties
are overcome, no real development can take place in this field of the law.
DAVID NIKLAS.
GENERAL ADMONITIONS TO JURY NOT TO READ NEWSPAPER AccOUNTS
OF TRIAL HELD SUFFICIENT TO COUNTERACT ADVERSE PUBLICITY.-The de-
fendant was indicted in the District Court of Park County for first de-
gree burglary. A motion for change of venue was granted and the case
removed to the District Court of Yellowstone County, where the de-
fendant was convicted of the crime charged. Fifteen counts of error
were specified. Included therein were the denial of the defendant's chal-
lenge to a member of the jury panel for having formed an opinion as
to the guilt or innocence of the defendant and the denial of his motion
for a mistrial. The motion for mistrial was founded upon the alleged mis-
conduct of the prosecutor who, at such time as the case was ready for
submission to the jury, filed a charge against a third party for embracery
of a juror trying the defendant. The charge was headlined in the local
newspaper and broadcast over radio and television. Prior to his arrest,
the defendant had been the Chief of Police of Livingston, Montana. This
factor probably contributed to the widespread publicity which his arrest
and trial received. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana, held,
affirmed. There was no showing that the trial court abused its discretion
or that there was error prejudicial to the defendant. State v. Moran,
384 P.2d 777, (Mont. 1963). 1
21id., at 507.
2"Id., at 517.
'Because indictment by grand jury is rarely used in Montana, it is significant to note
that the defendant in the instant case was so indicted. The last time a reported Mon-
tana case dealt with a grand jury was in 1950, in the case of State ex rel. Porter v.
Dist. Ct., 124 Mont. 249, 220 P.2d 1035 (1950). This case contains an excellent dis-
cussion of the grand jury in respect to its history, purpose, and application.
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RECENT DECISIONS
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed. . . ." A similar provision is found
in Article III, Section 16 of the Montana Constitution, which provides:
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to . . . a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed, subject to the right of the
state to have a change of venue for any of the causes for which the de-
fendant may obtain the same." Therefore, although Montana is not
bound by a federal court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, it
should consider such interpretation when applying Article III, Section 16
of the Montana Constitution.
Finding an impartial jury when matters prejudicial to the defendant
are published through public news media provides special problems for
the courts. Modern widespread communication brings before the majority
of persons all matters of interest. A criminal case involving one who has
served in public office, or a crime which arouses emotions and passions,
are of interest to all. For this reason, the courts have found it necessary
to concede that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused, without more, is not sufficient to rebut
the presumption of an individual juror's impartiality. To hold otherwise
would set an impossible standard. 2 However, when a juror states that
he has such an opinion, general inquiries during voir dire are necessary
to determine the nature and strength of the opinion. In such a case care
must be exercised to determine the depth of the opinion in order to assure
to the defendant a fair and impartial trial.3
The line of division between a fair and impartial trial and a denial of
the defendant's constitutional rights is one of degree and depends upon
the facts and circumstances of each individual case. However, the federal
courts have set forth guides to be considered in determining if these
rights have been denied and the defendant entitled to some relief. These
guides are: (1) whether the burden of adverse publicity was imposed
upon him by the improper conduct of the prosecutor or the state ;4 (2)
whether it was so widespread and so continuing that a continuance would
not serve to guarantee his constitutional rights; 5 and, (3) whether the
publicity was engendered at such a time and place that its effect upon
the mind of the public could not reasonably have been mitigated by the
time of trial.6
'Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). The problem before the United States Supreme
Court involved in part an Indiana statute. This statute was similar to REVISED CODES
OF MONTANA, 1947, § 94-7122, which was interpreted by the Montana Supreme Court
in the instant case. Hereinafter, REVISED CODES OF MONTANA are cited R.C.M.
'United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962). In the Aceardo case, the
publications began with the selection of the jury. The jury was separated each night
and exposed to the adverse matter. The appellate court stated that the trial judge
could not presume that his general admonitions were effective. He should have made
a careful examination of each juror outside the presence of the others. Such an ex-
amination would have overcome the reluctance to speak out.
'Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952) ; United States v. Hoffa, 205
F. Supp. 710 (S.D. Fla. 1962).
'United States v. Hoffa, note 4 supra.
'Delaney v. United States, note 4 supra.
1963]
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Although the above prejudicial elements may be present, the de-
fendant may not be entitled to relief if his attorney does not challenge
the prejudiced juror during voir dire7 or, if the trial judge has, in his
discretion, allowed the defense to examine individually and at length the
members of the jury panel.8
During voir dire jurors having a preformed opinion which prevents
them from deciding the case fairly and impartially may be directly chal-
lenged for cause and removed. But, when adverse publicity reaches a
jury during the course of the trial, such a challenge does not exist. In
such a situation, it is encumbent upon the court to examine individually,
in the absence of the other jurors, each member to determine the effect
of the publications upon them.9 Failure to eliminate publicity inspired
prejudice may require the granting of a new trial.
In the instant case, a prospective juror 0 stated on voir dire that he
had followed the case through the newspapers and on radio and television
and that he had formed an opinion. The trial court asked him whether
he could lay it aside. He replied, "Well, I would have to."" The de-
fendant's challenge for cause was denied. Prejudicial error was specified.
In consideration of this, the Supreme Court of Montana first referred to
Section 94-7122 of the Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, which provides
that no person is to be held incompetent to serve as a juror by
• . . reason of having formed or expressed an opinion upon the
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded upon
public rumor, statements in public journals, or common notoriety,
provided it appear to the court, upon his declaration, under oath,
or otherwise, that he can and will, notwithstanding such opinion,
act impartially and fairly upon the matters to be submitted to
him ....
The court then referred with approval to previous decisions' 2 which
state that it is necessary only that the juror truthfully state that he
can and will try the case on the evidence, for such preformed opinions
are ". . . usually indefinite and not deeply impressed upon the mind.'i 3
Although such an interpretation seems justified, a careful consideration
of the statute in its historical setting may lead to a different interpreta-
tion.
The statute as enacted in 1871 provided that :14
'Beck v. State of Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962) (two dissenting); Rizzo v. United
States, 304 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1962).
'Rizzo v. United States, note 7 supra.
'Delaney v. United States, note 4 supra.
1"While the juror having the preformed opinion did not sit on the case, for the purpose
of deciding whether such a juror was competent, the court decided the issue as if
he had. It is necessary therefore to consider the effect this decision will have on the
legal rights of future defendants faced with the same or similar problems.
"Instant case at 791.
"State v. Mott, 29 Mont. 292, 74 Pac. 728 (1903); State v. Byrne, 60 Mont. 317, 199
Pac. 262 (1921); State v. Vettere, 76 Mont. 577, 248 Pac. 179 (1926).
"State v. Mott, note 12 supra; instant case at 791.
"Montana Territorial Criminal Practice Act, -1871, § 286(11).
[Vol. 25,
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A challenge to an individual juror may be for one of the follow-
ing causes: . . . Having formed or expressed an opinion as to
the guilt or innocence of the defendant of the crime charged in
the indictment, or on any material fact to be tried, if it appear
that such opinion would prejudice or bias the mind of the juror.
This statute was amended in 1887,15 presumably as a consequence of the
Montana Territorial Court's decision in the case of United States v.
Upham."' In the Upham case, a juror stated that, "'If he found them the
least guilty, he would cinch them plenty;' or 'I am on the jury in those
cases, and will send up the defendant; .... ' "17 Counter affidavits were
filed to show that the statements had been made in jest or in sport. Upon
questioning by the trial court the prospective juror denied that he was
biased or prejudiced towards the defendants. The Montana Supreme
Court, nevertheless, held that there was no disputing the fact that the
juror had talked about the case and that such talk had evidenced
prejudice. The juror was held to have been incompetent and a new trial
granted.
The necessary result of the 1887 legislation was that a juror ad-
mittedly having a prejudicial opinion would be admitted as competent,
provided that the opinion was based upon newspaper reports or similar
accounts, and, provided that said juror testified under oath that he felt
able to render an impartial verdict. This was to be true regardless of the
concreteness of the opinion.'5 Although the statute of 1887 was again
amended in 1895, no material changes were made, 19 nor have any been
made since. 20
The Legislature's reaction to the Upham decision is understandable
considering the environment and the circumstances of the era. It was the
time of the vigilantes, of isolated communities and limited communica-
tions. In 1880, the total population of the Territory was only 39,157.
One county had a population of one hundred and eighty. The area of this
"Compiled Statutes of Montana, 1887, 3rd Div., § 287(11). "A challenge to an individ-
ual juror may be for one of the following causes: . . . Having formed or expressed
an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused; but if a juror states that he has
formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the court
shall thereupon proceed to examine such juror as to the ground of such opinion, and
if it appear to have been founded upon reading newspaper statements, communica-
tions, comments, or reports, or upon rumor or hearsay, and not upon conversations
with witnesses of the transaction, or reading reports of their testimony, or hearing
them testify, and the juror state, on oath, that he feels able, notwithstanding such
opinion, to render an impartial verdict upon the law and evidence, the court, if
satisfied that he is impartial, and will render such verdict, may, in its discretion, ad-
mit him as competent to serve in such case.''
12 Mont. 170 (1874) The court made no specific reference to this statute. However,
in the case of Territory v. Kennedy, 3 Mont. 520 (1880), on similar facts, the court
cited not only this statute but also the Upham case in reaching the same conclusion.
"United States v. Upham, 2 Mont. 170, 177 (1874).
"State v. Jackson, 9 Mont. 508, 24 Pac. 213 (1890); instant case at 791. Compare
note 28 infra.
"Compiled Statutes of Montana, 1887, 3rd Div., § 287(11), as amended, MONTANA
PENAL CODES ANNOTATED, 1895, § 2051. Prior to the amendment of 1895, the statute
included as an additional ground of challenge for implied bias: "Having formed or
expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused." While this ground
of challenge no longer exists, it is in part covered by the statutes for actual bias.
See R.C.M. 1947, §§ 94-7119, 94-7122.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 94-7122.
19631
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same county was 18.100 square miles. The county with the largest popu-
lation contained only 8,876 people. The total area of the Territory was
given as 143,776 square miles, 21 yet this same area had only about 20,000
persons eligible for jury duty.2 2 The scarcity of eligible jurors makes
apparent the necessity for holding competent a juror having an opinion
founded upon newspaper reports or the local gossip. As of 1960, how-
ever, the population of the State, for the ages of twenty-one and older,
was 451,479.23 At the present no county has an area larger than 5,580
square miles 2 4 and no county has a total population less than 890.25
Further, under present law, a greater percentage of the total population
is eligible for jury duty.2 6 Consequently, today no practical hardship is
imposed on the State in the selection of jury members. It would therefore
seem proper to place the emphasis upon the words of the statute ". . . act
impartially and fairly upon the matters submitted to him. '27 To place
the emphasis elsewhere emphasizes the antiquity of the statute and tends
to deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial2 8 as guaranteed
by Article III, Section 16 of the Montana Constitution. Yet, in the
instant case the court looked only to the truth of the juror's statement
that he could and would set the opinion aside, emphasizing the words
"... upon his declaration, oath, or otherwise . . .",29 It did not consider
the psychological impact an opinion once formed has upon the mind of
the average citizen.3°
nLEESON, HISTORY O MONTANA 457, 541, and 465 (1885).
This figure is only an approximation. It was reached by dividing the total male
population of about 28,200 into the total population, obtaining approximately 72%.
Thus if 72% of the population were male and if-as Leeson seems to indicate-only
about 27,640 persons were actual citizens, by multipying 27,640 by 72%, the figure of
19,900 indicates the approximate number of eligible jurors. At this period in Montana
history, large numbers of Orientals and others of foreign citizenship, having been left
unemployed when the great railroads were completed, flocked to the numerous mining
camps. All of these were ineligible to serve as jurors. Also, the MONTANA CIVIL
CODEs ANNOTATED, 1895, § 230, provided: "A person is competent to act as a juror
if he be: (1) A male citizen of the United States of the age of twenty-one and not
more than seventy years, who shall have been a resident of the state one year, and
of the county ninety days before being selected and returned. (2) In possession of
his natural faculties, and of ordinary intelligence, and not decrepit. (3) Possessed
of sufficient knowledge of the English Language. (4) Assessed on the last assess-
ment roll of the county on property belonging to him.'' While there were other
criteria limiting and exempting certain groups of persons from jury duty, they have
not been changed. See iR.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-1301-1305.
2AONTANA ALMANAC 23 (Stat. Supp. 1962-63).
NId., 5.
-Id., 25.26See note 22 supra. Under the present statutes both male and female are eligible as
jurors.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 94-7122.
-Irvin v. Dowd, note 2 supra. The United States Supreme Court stated that the adop-
tion of a rule by which a juror is not held incompetent for having a preconceived
"'notion"' as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant could not prevent inquiry
into the nature and strength of such "notion". In the Irvin case, eight jurors
admitted to having preformed opinions. One stated that he could not give the
defendant the benefit of the doubt, while another stated that it was impossible to
forget what you have heard. However, each juror having a preformed opinion indi-
cated that he could render an impartial verdict. In reversing the state court, the
Supreme Court stated that while the jurors may have been sincere in such statement,
it must be considered that an ". . . opinion once formed is so persistent that it
unconsciously fights detachment from the mental processes of the average man."
-R.C.M. 1947, § 94-7122.
'See note 28 supra. See Delaney v. United States, note 4 supra, where it is stated that
when pretrial publicity of a highly prejudicial nature does exist, the proper remedy
[Vol. 25,
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The second specification of error to be considered concerns the
defendant's motion for a mistrial.3 1 It was founded upon the conduct of
the State in filing an embracery charge against a third person and in-
volved a juror trying this case. On the morning of May 3, 1962, the trial
court admonished the jury not to read any newspaper accounts nor listen
to any radio or television broadcasts of the case. After this admonition
the court was recessed to settle instructions. That afternoon the em-
bracery charge was filed. On the morning of May 4, 1962, the defendant
moved for a mistrial, offering as exhibits newspapers containing head-
lines and accounts of the charge. He alleged that the filing of the charge
at this time amounted to a serious breach of conduct on the part of the
State and deprived him of a fair and impartial trial. The trial judge
expressed his confidence in the jury, stating that he was going to ask
them only as a matter of precaution whether they had disobeyed his
admonitions. He then requested any of them that had so done to raise
their hands. No hands were raised. The motion was denied. The court
then instructed the jury that they were not to be influenced in any way
by any news reports which they may have heard or read. The Supreme
Court in affirming the trial court's position noted that there was no
showing that any of the jurors had read any of the newspapers or heard
any of the broadcasts. It stated that it could not assume that any of
them had disobeyed the trial court's admonitions and instructions, that
the situation rested in the discretion of the trial court, and that there
was no showing of an abuse of that discretion.
Section 94-7603 (3) of the Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, provides
that a new trial is to be granted when ". . . the jury has been separated
without leave of the court, after returning to deliberate upon their ver-
dict, or been guilty of any misconduct by which a fair and due consid-
eration of the case has been prevented." 32 There is, however, no statutory
provision for granting a new trial where conduct of the state is the im-
is a continuance until such time as the adverse matter may reasonably have been
erased from the mind of the public. From this it would seem to follow that a contin-
uance would lessen the probability of preformed opinions. It would also serve to
answer the following questions: In the case of extreme widespread publications of a
highly prejudicial nature, would the defendant's constitutional rights be better pro-
tected by a juror who admits to having a preformed opinon but states that he can
and will try the case solely upon the evidence presented, than one that admits com-
ing into contact with the prejudicial matter yet states that he does not have such an
opinion, or one that has taken so little interest in the case, for reasons of mentality
or otherwise, that he has not read the newspapers or listened to news broadcasts on
the case though he has had ample opportunity to do so? See also Geagan v. Gavin,
181 F. Supp. 466 (D. Mass. 1960). This was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Public officials, including state prosecutors, had released for publication accounts of
how the Brinks crime was solved and of what role the petitioner had in that crime,
petitioner's alibis, prior criminal records, and other prejudicial matter. The court,
noting that some foreign countries hold prosecutors criminally liable for such conduct,
stated that in this country it may be ground for postponement or for setting aside
a judgment of conviction if defendant's motion for a continuance is denied. The
court denied the petition, however, because petitioners had not moved for a con-
tinuance or for a change of venue and because the trial court had spent many weeks
in a careful and patient voir dire examination. The court concluded that petitioners
were not held in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
'In the instant case, the motion for mistrial was not made in the presence of the jury.
'See State v. Jackson, note 18 supra, where it is said that subsection three and not
subsection two of R.C.M. 1947, § 94-7603, is to be considered, concerning news matter
improperly reaching the jury.
1963]
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mediate cause of mass publicity which, if it reaches the jury. may prevent
a fair and due consideration of the case. Yet, courts freely profess that
the state and its prosecuting officials owe a duty to the criminal de-
fendant to prevent, where possible, adverse publicity.33 The prosecutor
in the instant case violated this duty in filing the embracery charge
during the closing days of the trial.
In 1952, the First Circuit Court of Appeals considered this issue in
the case of Delaney v. United States.3 4 The defendant was a Collector
of Internal Revenue for the District of Massachusetts. He was suspended
by order of the President and shortly thereafter removed from office. A
grand jury returned an indictment charging him with the violation of
certain federal laws, including the falsification of tax lien certificates.
After this indictment, but prior to the trial, a House Subcommittee on
Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws conducted an investigation
into and a hearing on the affairs of the defendant. A great amount of
publicity, much of it going far beyond matters relevant to the pending
indictments, resulted therefrom. The trial judge granted two short con-
tinuances, but refused to grant a third. On appeal, the Circuit Court re-
versed and remanded. The appellate court noted that it was immaterial
whether the publicity was generated by the legislative branch of the
government or by the prosecuting officials. In either case, the prejudice
resulting to the defendant in being brought to trial in such an atmosphere
would obviously be as great. Here, the committee was acting within
lawful bounds, but in choosing to act at the time and manner it did, it
must accept the consequence of postponement. The judiciary is charged
by the Sixth Amendment with the duty of guaranteeing to the defendant
a fair trial before an impartial jury. It is not in harmony with this
amendment to make the defendant stand trial while the damaging effect
of the publicity was still within the public mind.
In the instant case, a continuance would be unavailable because the
publicity was generated during the course of the trial.35 Further, this
publicity was engendered by the prosecuting officials. Even if the prob-
ability of the publicity reaching the jury be minute, prejudice to the de-
fendant will result when the adverse matter is founded in a charge for
embracery. The psychological impact on the juror approached may sway
him to render a verdict of guilty lest it appear that he accepted the of-
mNot only does a public prosecutor have a duty to the citizens of the state, but he
also owes a duty of fairness to the accused. Accordingly, this duty prohibts the re-
lease of material, which may be prejudicial to the defendant, to news-disseminating
agencies. People v. Brommel, 56 Cal. 2d 629, 364 P.2d 845, 849 (1961). See also
People v. Rodriquez, 59 Cal. App. 2d 415, 136 P.2d 626, 629 (1943). "Both the district
attorney and the court have an affirmative duty to use their respective authority to
make certain that through no fault or omission on their part may a defendant be
deprived of his guaranteed right to a legal, fair and impartial trial."
uDelaney v. United States, note 4 supra.
'Rizzo v. United States, note 7 supra at 815. "Where during a trial it appears that
members of a jury have violated the instructions of the Court in the matter of read-
ing newspaper accounts of the trial, it is the proper practice, if not the required
practice, for the examination of individual jurors as to that matter to be conducted
in the absence of the other jurors . . . .The trial then being under way, the situation
is fraught with grave possibilities in the matter of mistrial. In the examination of
members of a jury panel in advance of their being selected as jurors in a trial about
to start the situation is different. . .. " In the latter situation, the members of the
panel having preformed opinions may be directly challenged for cause and removed.
[Vol. 25,
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fered bribe. Therefore, extra precautions are necessary. This is pre-
cisely the problem presented by the instant case but one which the Mon-
tana Supreme Court does not consider.
In response to the defendant's contention that the State's improper
conduct deprived him of a fair and impartial trial, the trial court noted
only that no showing had been made that any prejudicial matter had
reached the jury. Nevertheless the court took the precaution of a general
inquiry made in open court, and relied upon the presumption that the
jury had obeyed its admonitions, and that if it had not, any prejudice
would be cured by an instruction to disregard any news report they may
have read or heard. While the law presumes good character, it can also
be assumed that outside influences will affect some members of the jury,
and may do so as to escape detection. 6 General admonitions and instruc-
tion are not sufficient and cannot be assumed to be effective in counter-
ing this influence. It is encumbent upon the trial judge in the exercise
of his duty to guarantee to the defendant a fair and impartial trial; to
do more than merely request any who had not obeyed his instruction to
raise their hands.3
7
Each case must be decided upon its own special facts. In the instant
case the combination of prosecutor misconduct, the probability that the
jury may have come into contact with the prejudicial publications, and
the failure of the trial judge to adequately probe this probability war-
ranted additional consideration by the Montana Supreme Court. If the
guarantee of a fair trial necessitated the calling of the individual jurors
into chambers to be questioned only in the presence of the trial judge
to determine whether they had read the publications and whether it had
rendered them incompetent, then the law required no less. 38
In this discussion of th case of State v. Moran, two specifications of
error have been considered. The denial of the defendant's challenge to the
juror may not have been a denial of his rights as guaranteed by Article
III, Section 16 of the Montana Constitution. Neither may the misconduct
of the prosecuting official. It is difficult to conclude however that the
combination of the alleged errors was not prejudicial and should not have
resulted in a new trial.
It has been suggested that the Montana Supreme Court in interpret-
ing and applying Article III, Section 16 of the Montana Constitution con-
sider the Federal Courts' interpretation and application of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, the denial of
a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment may be
also a denial of due process of law as demanded by the Fourteenth. The
failure to observe the constitutional safeguards of the Fourteenth
Amendment renders the trial and the conviction of a criminal defendant
convicted in a state court illegal and void.39 The constitutional test of
-Near v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1963).
87United States v. Accardo, note 3 supra at 136. It is insufficient to ask the jury in
open court, ,1. . . have you followed my direction in that regard?"3sUnited States v. Accardo, note 3 supra.
8Lane v. The Warden, 320 F.2d 179, 186 (4th Cir. 1963). "... The denial of a fair
and impartial trial as guaranteed by the 6th Amendment to the Constitution, is also
a denial of due process, demanded by the 5th and 14th Amendments .... ,
1963]
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impartiality required by the Fourteenth Amendment does not depend
upon the subjective declarations of the individual jurors.4 0 Instead it
depends upon the common man's concept of fairness. It is vital that
the jury consider the case free from all prejudicial influences.
FRED RATHERT.
STATE NOT REQUIRED TO GIVE COMPENSATION FOR A PARTIAL TAKING OF
DEFENDANT'S AcCESS.-In 1959 the defendant leased land adjacent to a
major highway for the purpose of constructing a service station. Since
the highway and land were on the same level, patrons could easily use
the entire 300 foot frontage of the tract. A secondary road along one
side of the acreage provided auxiliary access. In 1960 the State informed
the defendant that an improved highway was to replace the older way.'
The new road was to be wider, increase the grade, and utilize a traffic
divider.2 Because of the increase in grade and the resultant limitation
of access, the State proposed to build an approach to the tract. The de-
fendant's request for more than one such approach was denied. The
State instituted a condemnation proceeding against the defendant which
resulted in an award for land and access taken. However, the court re-
fused to instruct the jury that they could not consider the loss to de-
fendant's business due to the difficulty of traffic in crossing the center
divider except as the loss might affect the decline in value of the remain-
ing property. On appeal by the State to the Montana Supreme Court,
held, reversed and remanded. The refused instructions should have been
given since, without them, the jury could not have adequately deter-
mined the declining value of the land. Also, the State need only pay
compensation for access when it has been completely denied or the re-
maining access is unreasonable. State Highway Comm'r v. Keneally,
384 P.2d 770 (MNont. 1963).
Although, in the instant case, the court is quite correct in its final
conclusion, it is believed that some foundation for the decision should
have been laid. The construction of the interstate highway system in
this State will undoubtedly increase the probability of litigation regard-
ing the character of access and the procedure by which it is taken. Thus,
such a foundation would have been of considerable value as a guide in
deciding future cases dealing with the same subject.
The rights possessed by an owner of land abutting a highway re-
ceived little attention prior to the development of the "super" or "con-
trolled access" highways.3 With the advent of such highways, however,
"United States v. Smith, 200 F. Supp. 885, 908 (D. Vt. 1962).
'Although the highway in the instant case was not of the controlled access variety,
the issues posed are the same as if it had been.
2This device would eliminate potential customers wishing to make a left turn across
the road to the station, except for those who turned left at the frontage road at
which point the divider had a separation.
'One of the first recorded decisions is found in an 1839 Kentucky case. The Lexington
& Ohio By. Co. v. Applegate, 8 Dana. 289 (Ky. 1839). English law on the subject
evolved somewhat earlier. Woodyer v. Hadden, 5 Taunt. 125, 128 Eng. Rep. (C.P.
1813).
[Vol. 25,
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